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Rhetoric and Phenomenology
of Art
Notes towards an
understanding of rhetoric
Paolo Bagni

1. Within the context of a necessary investigation of the elements
which go to make up the contemporary understanding of rhetoric,
I wish to draw attention to what may be called the "the phenomenology of art," a methodological approach which, whilst neither
springing exclusively from the field of rhetorical studies in the
strictest sense, nor exclusively concerned with rhetorical ideas,
has nonetheless given rise to an approach which is extremely
significant for rhetoric and which has produced some important
critical studies. 1 I am using "phenomenology of art" here to refer
to that line of aesthetic reflection which finds its point of focus in
the thought of Luciano Anceschi, with respect to the ideas of
poetics [poetica]and "institutions of poetry" [istituzionidellapoesia],
and which has its theoretical basis in the philosophy of Antonio
Banfi and his rejection of a single-level reflection of art in favor
of a multiple-mode aesthetics carried out within an open organization of knowledge. 2
Where does the point of contact lie between an insistently
philosophical aesthetics and rhetoric? A passage from Banfi makes
the connection clear. In his introduction to a translation of Lon-
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ginus' On the Sublime, published in 1949, we find the following
indications:
Romantic art and modern and contemporary art in general admits
and even appreciates the irregularity of its subjective effects as a
proof of its full expansive capacity. In this way it justifies the fact of
being able to be considered as a simple opportunity for causing such
an imaginative and emotional development. Ancient art, because
of its origins and of the ethical and social function which it exercised,
was more concerned with controlling, guiding and coordinating
these effects and for this reason it has a principally oratorical intentionality. As a result, the principles and rules of rhetoric have a
double meaning in ancient literature. On the one hand, they indicate the formative structure of the reality of art in its independence
of existential reality from which it nonetheless draws its worth as
an imitation and idealization. On the other hand, these rules control
the emotional and imaginative after-life of art as they create, one
might say, art's definitive horizon as not only aesthetic principles
but as hedonistic or moral principles. [... ]
The development of classical rhetoric thus offers a valuable
field of analysis for the phenomenology of art and for the clarification
of the complex structure which lies at the base both of the aesthetic
independence and the human effectiveness of ancient art and which
thus determines the typical idealizing nature of art. The ease with
which the subjective aesthetics of lyricism and of intuition has eliminated rhetoric and dismissed it as an empty product of classification
and intellectualistic analysis is an effect of the special nature of
modern art, particularly in its romantic manifestations. In truth, it
is only through the study of the system of rhetoric that the creation
and value of ancient art is understandable and appreciable and that
the lines of continuity in its historical development may be discerned. It is only through the function of rhetoric that the bounds
and connections of the various directions of reflection on art can
become clear. 3

Prior to the experience of modern art, rhetoric seems to be a
"definitive horizon" and "the formative structure of the reality of
art." This is a definition which seems at first sight to fall within
an opposition between ancient and modern art. While such an
opposition is quite permissible in a criticalperspective, it is by no
means satisfactory in a theoreticalperspective. However, the "ancient"/"modern" theme plays another, far more decisive role in
this passage: indeed, the overshadowing of rhetoric-"The ease
with which the subjective aesthetics of lyricism and of intuition
has eliminated rhetoric" -is an effect of modern art, an effect of
"the special nature of modern art."
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Here we can see that a precise distortion has been effected
on rhetoric by modern thought. The devaluation of rhetoric is not
a natural effect of the modern on the ancient but rather an intended
and particular denial of the reality of art.
It would be easy to trace in Banfi' s formula "subjective aesthetics
of lyricism and of intuition" a veiled allusion to Benedetto Croce.
While not denying Banfi' s strong opposition to Croce's
philosophy, I shall turn aside, at least for the moment, from the
duel with Croce in order to step back a little from the formulae
and histrionic gestures of "denial" and "ransoming" of rhetoric
and try to follow the development and use of certain motifs and
meanings which are important to the idea of rhetoric. In this way,
I shall attempt to demonstrate the specific sense of the connection
between rhetoric and phenomenology of art which I use in my title.
Significant elements for our analysis may be found in the
second half of the nineteenth century against the background of
Croce's philosophical obliteration of rhetoric. Herbert Spencer's
"Philosophy of Style" (1852) presents a good positivist example
of the naturalization of rhetoric . Spencer's argument is characteristically neat and to the point. Having subordinated conventions
to natural gifts and usage, he then affronts the question of the
principles of style:

2.

good composition is far less dependent on acquaintance with its
laws, than on practice and natural aptitude. A clear head, a quick
imagination, and a sensitive ear, will go far towards making all
rhetorical precepts needless. [... ] Nevertheless, some result may
be expected from a familiarity with the principles of style. [... ]
No general theory of expression seems yet to have been enunciated. The maxims contained in works on composition and
rhetoric, are presented in an unorganized form. Standing as isolated
dogmas---as empirical generalizations, they are neither so clearly
apprehended, nor so much respected, as they would be if they
were deduced from simple first principle. [... ] But, however influential the precepts thus dogmatically expressed, they would be
much more influential if reduced to something like scientific ordination. In this as in other cases, conviction is strengthened when
we understand the why. And we may be sure that recognition of
the general principle from which the rules of composition result,
will not only bring them home to us with greater force, but will
disclose other rules of like origin.
On seeking for some clue to the law underlying these current
maxims, we may see implied in many of them, the importance of
economizing the reader's or hearer's attention. To so present ideas
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that they may be apprehended with the least possible mental effort,
is the desideratum towards which most of the rules above quoted
point. 4

Though Spencer tends to avoid the use of the word "rhetoric,"
preferring the terms "grammar" or "style," he proposes as valid
and possible a rhetoric which is a deduction and definition of techniques which will achieve an efficient use of language, working
from scientifically based "first principles." When these principles
are encompassed in an economy of mental effort, 5 they give rise
to a general theory of expression which brings into play a notion
of language as both vehicle and hindrance of thought:
Regarding language as an apparatus of symbols for conveying
thought, we may say that, as in a mechanical apparatus, the more
simple, the better arranged its parts, the greater will be the effect produced. In either case, whatever force is absorbed by the machine is
deducted from the result. [... ] How truly language must be regarded as a hindrance to thought, though the necessary instrument
of it, we shall clearly perceive on remembering the comparative
force with which simple ideas are communicated by signs. 6

It is significant here that the idea of efficient use of language is
not connected to any notion of expressive embellishment. At most,
the efficient use of language is resolved in the extra-linguistic
efficiency of gesture or sign. The instrumental nature of language
with regard to thought reveals it to be not only an obstacle or
hindrance to thought (and here lies the usefulness of clear, persuasive rules which may be deduced from a general theory of expression), but it also allows it to be re-absorbed into the immediate,
simple, natural expression of gesture from which it first emerged,
distinguishing itself in the more complicated form of language .
Rhetoric is "naturalized" according to a theory of expression
which continually tends to dissolve the specific linguistic element.
Expressiveness, or expressive efficiency, is traced back to the natural condition of the gesture, and rhetoric is reduced to a preexisting feature which is defined in terms of emotions, sentiments
or passions rather than in linguistic terms. Thus psychological
factors come to be given primary importance in many late-nineteenth-century treatments of aesthetics.
I. A. Richards' The Philosophyof Rhetoric(1936), although never
specifically mentioning Spencer, can be seen as a perfect antithesis
to the "Philosophy of Style ." Richards' idea of rhetoric as the
study of verbal ambiguities and their relative corrections is a re-
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verse image of Spencer's efficiency. 7 Richards places even further
back in the history of rhetoric such a "fallacy" which sees only
the problem of how to use in the best possible way the evident
undeniable powers of expression which words already contain.
Spencer works within a vision of language seen as a ready-made
tool to be used in the best possible ways, while Richards' view
of rhetoric as a study of verbal ambiguities sees the precariousness
of words not as a casual accident in the use of language but as
the very nature of linguistic meaning. The mechanism of metaphor
matches the mechanism of verbal signification and has its roots
in the theorem in which verbal meaning functions as delegated
efficiency of omitted contexts.
Confronting Richards' idea of rhetoric with Spencer's, rhetoric
takes on a linguistic consistency but with respect to a linguistics
of the signifiedrather than the signifierand remains within a semantics still very open to psychological elements. 8
Benedetto Croce's obliteration of rhetoric through the identity
of intuition and expression postulates a clear de-psychologization
of the idea of expression, midway between the extremes of Spencer
and Richards. For Croce, expression is identified as a type of
knowledge which is appropriate to the dialectics of the Spirit, as
intuitive knowledge . As a result, it has no requirement of any
type of psychological content . However, following Croce's argument consistently, we go beyond even this. The specific linguistic
element is obliterated in the single legitimate science of expression,
that is, aesthetics . For Croce, beauty is successful expression or
simply expression. 9
In order to fit this concept, rhetoric has to be reduced to the
simulacrum of the "double form." 10 Once rhetoric has been reduced to the theory of decorated expression, and seen as merely
an embellished re-elaboration of simple expressions, it can then
be governed and obliterated by the identity of intuition and expression. While Spencer naturalized rhetoric in the context of psychophysical expressiveness, Croce annuls it in the conceptual device
of a theoretical category. In both cases the idea of rhetoric is
reduced to the idea of a technique for treating a verbal material
which already exists or is otherwise accessible. In both cases language moves away towards something other than itself, be it
immediate natural expression in the one case or an all-inclusive
totalizing mechanism of the identity of the categories of intuition
and expression in the other .
The understanding of rhetoric against which Croce's position

3.
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stands and reacts is thus a naturalized rhetoric reduced in the
combination of, in Spencer's terms, grammar and style. However,
another annulment of rhetoric is also offered in the same period
which is very different from Croce's position. To name but one
among several contrasting speculations on rhetoric at this time,
Michelstaedter offers a very different view. 11 For Michelstaedter,
the illusory nature of rhetoric is a result of the impossibility of
persuasion, the impossibility of possessing ourselves and our own
life. He makes an analogy with weight which, always striving to
reach a lower level, "is itself an impediment to possessing its own
life and depends only on itself in the fact that it can do nothing
but fall, it has no possibility of resisting its situation. Weight can
never be persuaded. " 12 Rhetorical illusion covers and hides the
impossible possession of truth.
When criticizing the dogmatic rules of traditional ideas of
rhetoric, Croce has often been assigned a liberating influence and
his position hailed as one which affirmed the creative liberty of
art in contrast to the confines and rules of rhetoric. This view
belongs clearly to the romantic tradition and is of no particular
interest here. It is more interesting to observe how, at the turn
of the century, positions of normative rhetoric were explicitly
re-proposed and to note the reactions these aroused in the climate
of "psychological rhetoric." In France, an interesting example of
this debate can be found in the dispute between A . Albalat, author
of L'Art d'ecrireenseigneen vingt lerons,13 and Remy de Gourmont.
At the end of the nineteenth century in France, many scholars
turned their attention to rhetoric, particularly due to the institutional changes which occurred in 1885 when the teaching of
rhetoric was abolished in favor of "summary notions of the History
of Greek, Latin and French Literatures." A.-Ed. Chaignet, for
example, opened his La Rhetoriqueet son histoire, written at the
turn of the century, 14 with the call for a systematic study of literature for the education and exercise of taste. The cultural climate
was marked by a sense of the beautiful and an aesthetic taste, the
belief in a literary value existing in a timeless dimension which
governs history. Literature was considered superior to History of
Literature. A contribution of Brunetiere to this line of reasoning
offers more carefully articulated and less diaphanous motivations
for the necessity to which rhetoric responds: "It is for oneself but
also for others that one writes and speaks. " 15 Thus literature and
art have a social mission to express and they show the worth of
the communal word "which comes from the heart of our fellow
4.
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beings and reaches into our own heart," for "We cannot live by
bread, algebra and exegesis alone. " 16
The call was for a normativerhetoric, if by this is understood
a reasoned system of timeless laws and rules for language and
thought as general, universal concerns of humanity. Such a theory
of rhetoric was considered by many to be a didactic, pedagogical,
even political necessity in France in this period.
Albalat has a much less ambitious and far-reaching objective,
but is quite precise in his belief in efficiency. 17 He defends stoically
the teachability of the art of writing and the concer,t of literature
as a trade which can be learned and praci.iced like any other.
Albalat's writings blend a monumental respect for "Literature"
and "Great Writers" with a cast-iron faith in the teaching of
techniques and the analysis of the trade through the study of the
masters and their works. For Albalat, reflection takes first place
as part of the work which modifies inspiration and spontanei7
word by word: "You are not born original, you become original. " 1
However, the most interesting aspect of Albalat's work for
our survey is the reaction it caused in Remy de Gourmont with
respect to the concept of style . The crux of their dispute is this:
while Albalat puts forward the idea that expressive facts stem not
from "emotions" but from "will" by means of a conscious and
conscientious process of work, Gourmont states that "style is a
specialization of sensibility." 19 Such a definition stems from the
theme of the psyche-physical unity of human beings, that is, of
the continuity between the physiological and the psychological.
This theme appears also in Spencer, and his "The Origin and
Function of Music" 20 should be read in conjunction with "The
Philosophy of Style" in this respect. For Spencer, music starts
from the voice, from the physiological response to an emotion.
The voice contains all the elements-tone,
pitch, etc.-which the
evolution of music has been concerned with discovering, gathering and condensing to use systematically .
The investigations of creative mechanisms springing from the
idea of psycho-physical unity of the mind and the continuity between brain and thought move the understanding of rhetoric into
the context of a psychology of invention .21 There are many examples of this progression. Hennequin's La CritiqueScientifique,22 for
example, proposes a model in which an initial aesthetic analysis,
directed towards the discovery of the particular emotion produced
by that emotion-producing machine, the work of art, is followed
by a psychological analysis which sets out to find the equivalent
structure to the mechanisms operating in the work of art in the
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mind of the author. Lacombe's Introduction a l'histoire litteraire23
suggests as the central mechanism of literary invention a psychology of the writer consisting of the sequence sensibility-memoryimagination-emotion-to-be-communicated.
Lacombe also draws
attention to an element diametrically opposed to the methodological
psychologism which dominates his theory in general. This element
is also expressed in the language of psychology, using the concept
of suggestion. 24 The ability of expression of a poet or writer depends
not on a "special" sensitivity but rather on a more highly developed
"record of an emotion" which is substantially a "language record."
A poet feels his or her own emotions and contemporaneously thinks
about them (thus linguistically recording them); when the emotionto-be-communicated is expressed, inspiration-that is, the wish to
communicate emotions--is fed through the auto-suggestion to the
verbal sign. Thus the expressive moment feeds back to the emotionto-be-communicated. 25 This emphasis on the linguistic dimension
finds its outcome in Lacombe in specific attention to rhetorical figures
and in a reclassification of these figures whereby rhetoric is seen
almost as the language of the psychology of invention. 26
s. The split in the understanding of style which appears between
the totalizing position of psychologistic reduction and the independent, irreducible strength of the linguistic dimension becomes even
wider in Gourmont. Gourmont is immovable in his conviction that
style is part of the psycho ·physiological condition of human beings:
Style cannot be taught. It is completely futile to talk of the pedagogical
aspects of the question. The real problem of style is a matter of physiology. [... ] We write as we feel, as we think, with the whole of our
body. Intelligence is only one of the modes of being of sensibility
and it is certainly neither the most stable nor the most voluntary. 27

Gourmont cites Buffon' s maxim that "Le style c'est l'homme" as
"the affirmation of a naturalist, one who knows that bird songs are
determined by the shape of the beak, the form of the tongue and
the size of the throat and lungs. The question of style concerns
grammarians only if th~ are prepared to work from solid psychophysiological notions." Gourmont's views on philosophy repeat
once again his belief that style is produced by the total act of writing,
not merely by a surface verbal layer: "what is a doctrine, if not the
verbal translation of a physiology?" 29
Thus if style is a specialization of sensibility, all style must
be involuntary. This physiological interpretation effectively precludes any role for education and instruction. In response to the
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"professors of sociology" who have invented the idea of mentality,
Gourmont states firmly that the brain is all or nothing, quoting
Taine who had said that "the brain secretes thought just as the
liver secretes bile." 30 Within this absolute physiologization of style,
however, there appears an unsettling idea of literature whereby
all art and literature and every social or cultural creation depends
on the primary and primordial faculty of the lie. Gourmont sees
the lie in terms of an opposition in physiological terms for it is
what can be opposed to imitation, or the animal-type camouflage
as an adaptation to the environment. Gourmont's idea of lie is
revealed in his counter-opposition
of Homer and Flaubert.
Homer's precision is incapable of lying while Flaubert has an
infinite ability in lying and provides his readers not with the exact
sensation but with the confusion, which is visually absurd yet
artistically admirable, of a "double et trouble" sensation. 31
Troubleis the key word in Gourmont's "physiology," which
is repeatedly and confusedly redoubled in any necessity and task,
in any logicand any event. If there is a linear, consequential circuit
which moves from sensations to word-images, to word-ideas, to
word-feelings, this closed circuit is reactivated by the tendency
of feelings to pass into action, which is in turn the source of our
strongest and most acute sensations. However, "this resembles
closely (perhaps too closely) the circulation of the blood. Les
troublesof the circulation of ideas produce literature, art, games,
culture." 32 With our "synaesthetic" tendencies we are closer to
Flaubert than to Homer because we cannot separate the double
or triple images which simultaneously arise when we think of a
fact, in our brains troublesby tumultuous sensations. 33 Finally, for
Flaubert, the true hero of Gourmont's study (at crucial points in
the argument Gourmont adds a quotation from Bouvard et
Pecuchet),the necessity of this troublephysiology becomes an active
task:
No matter what school he had been trained in, Flaubert would
have become what he was, himself. Life is a filtering. Man's task
in life is to clean his personality, to flush out all the waste products
deposited there by education and to free it from all traces left there
by what he admired as an adolescent. 34

The dispute between Albalat and Gourmont may stand as an
emblem of a conflict between a normative rhetoric and a
naturalized rhetoric in which a notion of style is germinated and
transplanted into a new field. Gourmont's aversion to normative
rhetoric is not an aversion to a scheme of rhetoric in and by itself, 35

6.
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but rather to a pedagogical role for rhetoric. For Gourmont and
his idea of physiology, the intended receiver of such a pedagogical
role does not exist, for humanity is something else entirely. What
can be produced by means of a rhetorical training or instruction
has nothing to do with art. These are problems which, although
more basic and less soul-searching, are nonetheless close to those
outlined by Michelstaedter. In the early years of the present century there are many reappearances of such themes, with frequent
echoes of Nietzsche, turned to the subject of rhetoric with discourses on being, truth and language. 36
Once rhetoric has moved away from the idea of a normative
system, it can develop in the context of the discussion and concept
of style which may be found in many central areas of contemporary
culture. The concern with style forms a dense interweaving of
motivations and methodologies which cannot be adequately contained under the simple heading of "stylistics." The notion of
distortion represents perhaps the most characteristic indication of
the complexity and richness of the present situation. Once normative ideas have been abandoned, the conceptual mechanism of
the idea of a norm (with its latent content of deviation and transgression of the norm, of distortion) becomes available for use in
considering the validity, the possibility of legitimization and the
practicability of a new idea of style. This is important for at least
one reason. In Langue et techniquespoetiquesa l'epoque romane,37
Paul Zumthor entitled one of his chapters "L' ecart rhetorique"
and was careful to attribute the source of the term to Valery. This
seems to me to demonstrate quite clearly that the cultural vitality
of the idea of distortion, or ecart, is not only due to the interest of
linguists and theorists of stylistics but also to the fact that the idea
draws on one of the principal currents of twentieth-century poetry,
on what Valery defined as pure and absolute poetry. 31J
While Richards' The Philosophyof Rhetoric tended to resolve
rhetoric into semantics and a linguistics of the signified which
privileged the idea of ambiguity,39 the problems and internal crises
of the supporters of psychologism gave rise, through the responses of opposition which these provoked at the beginning of
this century, to a stylistic rhetoric which was more concerned with
a linguistics of the signifier and which gave prime importance to
the idea of distortion. It is quite possible to read Roman Jakobson's
famous article on "Linguistics and Poetics" as an attempt to summarize and to crystallize in a scientific manner-working
from a
linguistics of functions-the ideas of distortion and ambiguity.40
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What do these fragments from the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century offer us for an understanding of rhetoric? They
range from a pedagogy of style which has its last line of resistance
in using the works of the masters as exemplars, to theories of a
psycho-physiology of style which both absorbs and rejects ideas
laid down by a naturalized rhetoric. Their varying elements and
intentions of meaning reveal an illuminating series of problems, a
referentof signification[referentedi significazione]for that variegated
tendency in nineteenth-century culture which gathers up rhetorical terms and concepts, and brings them together in the idea of
style [tema dello stile].
Let us turn once again to the passage from Banfi quoted at
the beginning of this article. While Banfi's emphasis on rhetoric
cannot be simply explained in its general methodological movement as an opportunistic attack on Croce's views, neither can it
be satisfactorily inserted in the ideas of rhetoric outlined above .
For Banfi, rhetoric seems to be operating closer to the idea of
tradition rather than to the idea of style.
The idea of tradition is not entirely incompatible with a normative rhetoric, of course. However, normative rhetoric often has
the tendency to confuse and obscure the idea of tradition by presuming it to be a set of values which can then be applied. This
confusion appears in the above-mentioned work of Brunetiere,
"Apologie pour la rhetorique," which concludes with the argument against the substitution of rhetoric by literary history, in the
name of the project of "classical French teaching." Since classical
French literature is essentially oratorical ("our greatest writers did
not see themselves write: they felt writing" 41 ), rhetoric has an undeniable historical-exegetical necessity. Although in this instance
Brunetiere' s argument is couched in terms suitable for a discussion
of school curriculum and pedagogy, elsewhere he uses a more
elevated sphere of reference when he states that a "classical"
literature is conceivable only because of the universality of values
which it represents. Thus the intended recipient of the pedagogical
force is not merely pupils in the classroom but is the whole of
humanity. It is needless to state that such ideas stood little chance
of acceptance or survival against the turbulent views of the following century.
Leaving aside pedagogic presumptions and normative assertions of values, the idea of tradition takes on new life as a means
of questioning the present, and of ways of going about things in
the present .
7.
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The importance of Valery with respect to the ideaof distortion
was pointed out above, but another equally influential poet may
be called upon here. In T. S. Eliot's study "Tradition and the
Individual Talent" (1920), t_he conditions of creating poetry are
examined. Eliot turns his attention to the need, for the poet, of a
historical sense which is "a sense of the timeless as well as of the
temporal and of the timeless and of the temporal together.
" 42
According to Eliot:
The existing monuments form an ideal order among themselves,
which is modified by the introduction of the new (the really new)
work of art among them. The existing order is complete before the
new work arrives; for order to persist after the supervention of
novelty, the whole existing order must be, if ever so slightly, altered .... 43

The past is renewed by the present as the present is supported
by the past. The poet must therefore undergo a permanent extinction of personality, the poet must "surrender himself wholly to the
work to be done." 44 We are a long way here from style seen as a
"specialization of sensibility."
Anceschi moves on from this idea in Eliot of tradition as a
changing order and sees in Husserl the idea that the past, or what
is considered finished and set, a past which is silent and multilayered, can be remade and can be made into the present in
relation to a future horizon, which exists as an intentionalprospective.45 However, if it is the future, as a project of doing, which
enables the past to be made present, the present life of the past
is possible because the linking up of comprehension occurs within
the unity of the community of communication. It is realized within
the framework of language as an intersubjective mediation, language not as a mere exchange of information but as a connection
in a community for which the setting of spoken language in writing
guarantees both a continuity and a continuation.
A word (a work of art) is not alive simply because it has the
quality of an authentic event (there are many possible modes of
authenticity : coincidence with the a priori synthesis intuitionexpression, being rooted in the integral totality of human being,
etc.), but rather because it continues and lasts in the intersubjective
intentional work of language, of the community and of the human
possibility of projecting from the present. Such an idea of tradition
gives rise to an attention to objective structures of the work of art
itself, objective structures understood not as facts which can be
reduced scientifically to validity with any preexistent discipline,
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but as structures which are objective in the sense of having a
quality of lasting intention which cannot but outlive them.
The explicit idea of a rhetoric is taken up again in that more
intensive movement in considering the work of art which finds
its realization in the notion of poetics. The first and most general
sense of poetics lies in the desire to move reflection on art outside
of an exclusive, petrified, philosophical methodology and to recognize the multiplicity of modes and levels and the different
intentions which go to make up the work of art. Above all, poetics
displays the intimate and inescapable connection between art and
knowledge of art; poetics is also the poet's reflection on the craft
of poetry, it is not a secondary activity which is carried out around
the work of art but is an intention of sense which penetrates the
work and is active in its structure. It is not an ideal or mental
anticipation of the work of art but an active principle which intimately guides the very construction of the work of art.
It follows, therefore, that there is no work of art (object, event
or experience which we consider to belong to the cultural sphere
"art") that does not contain a thread of reflection on art in its
structure. Anceschi has shown in his analysis of the notion of
literary "institutions" that these are "a certain idea of principles
created for doing, a certain plan of rules," 46 which lead to an area
of pragmatic reflection. Thus what we enclose in the ideaof poetics

8.

is both an intrinsic moment of art in the processof being made and the
indicationof a possiblediscourseand knowledgeof art.
.
This is the area in which this phenomenology of art rediscovers
the relevance of rhetoric. It i~ when we work to build an image
of the complexity of the work of art, which includes the objectivity
of its structures, the intentionality of its project and the relationship between these two terms, that rhetoric reappears as an institutional framework and as a field of possibility of the work of artnaturally in the overlapping, the shifting, the layering and the
interference with other frameworks and other possibilities.
Such a reappearance of rhetoric was earlier termed the ideaof
tradition not because it was intended to allude to something alive
in the past which needed to be considered in order to understand
that past nor even to indicate some improbable canon of essential
values, but because rhetoric provides a crucial example of how
"tradition" is an inevitable idea in any present which projects its
own future, in the apparently minimal and inert everyday detail
of doing things. E. R. Curtius noted with magisterial simplicity
that: "Where literature is a school subject we have elements of a
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systematized study of literature. " 47 Similar appeals to the more
humble, blind or even mechanical dealing with literary works
begins a wealth of somewhat more fruitful theoretical suggestions
made by many recent developments in the "theory" and "science"
of literature.
Finally, if we are working within the framework of the structured work of poetics, pragmatic reflection, which is an intrinsic
moment of art and an element in the knowledge of art, will give
rise to the need for theoretical clarification. Theoreticalshould be
understood here in the plural sense of theories, different ways
and levels of grouping and solving problems. This clarification
will produce a discourse on art in which we shall also be speaking,
diversely but exhaustively, about something other than art. In this
way, the rhetoric used in such a discourse will not be a rhetoric
of the "restricted" kind but will be shown in the full breadth of
its cultural spread, demonstrating relevance and usefulness in
many areas and directions of knowledge and applicable to many
widely differing forms and problems of cultural life.
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